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Resumo
Passagem de Fronteira: as Políticas da Transnacio-
nalidade na Região Fronteiriça entre o Afeganistão 
e o Paquistão
As áreas fronteiriças entre o Afeganistão e o Paquistão 
são uma região complexa que desafia generalizações 
estáticas e estatistas – generalizações que muitas vezes 
traem os preconceitos deixados pelo período colonial, 
ou evidenciando o poder de um discurso orientalista 
ainda vigente, como sejam os discursos essencialistas 
acerca do tribalismo Pashtun ou a radicalização isla‑
mista. Este artigo argumenta que qualquer estudo útil 
da chamada ‘região Af‑Pak’ deve afastar‑se destas nar‑
rativas estereotípicas, e focar‑se ao invés nas estraté‑
gias e repertórios (ou práticas) dos actores locais, como 
exemplos de mobilização transnacional que transcen‑
de tanto as instituições formais do Estado, como as 
restrições legais da Linha Durand. Adicionalmente, 
a lista de actores a estudar – sobretudo para os inte‑
ressados em desenvolver recomendações para o de‑
senvolvimento de políticas concretas – deverá ir além 
dos ‘militantes tribais’. Ao invés, uma tal lista deverá 
incluir diversos movimentos e redes sócio‑políticas, 
e examinar como se relacionam entre si, por exemplo 
formando coligações transnacionais. O estudo com‑
petente desta região fronteiriça deverá ainda prestar 
atenção às estratégias destes actores locais em relação 
ao espaço transnacional e transfronteiriço (espaço so‑
cial bem como geográfico) no qual a sua mobilização 
se produz, como por exemplo nos casos dos refugia‑
dos, deslocados internos, ou diásporas (incluindo as 
comunidades étnicas espalhadas pela região). O artigo 
propõe que o caminho a seguir passa por adoptar es‑
tratégias de investigação que evitem a subalternização 
das perspectivas, conhecimento e práticas locais.
Abstract
The border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan are a 
complex setting that defies static, and statist generaliza-
tions – generalizations that often betray the prejudices 
left behind as traces of a bygone colonial era, or the on-
going power of Orientalist discourse, like the essentialist 
discourse on Pashtun tribalism or Islamist radicaliza-
tion. This article contends that any useful study of the so-
called Af-Pak border region should move away from such 
stereotypical narratives, and focus instead on the strate-
gies and repertories (i.e. practices) of actors, as examples 
of transnational mobilization that transcends both formal 
state institutions, and the legal strictures of the Durand 
Line. Moreover, the list of actors to study – especially for 
those trying to develop policy – relevant recommendations 
– should go beyond ‘tribal militants’. Instead, such a list 
should include diverse social and political movements and 
networks, and examine their relationship to one another, 
often in looser transnational coalitions. The competent 
study of the border region must also pay attention to the 
strategies of actors in relation to the transborder, tran-
snational space they inhabit (social as well as geographic) 
in which mobilization occurs, as in the case of refugees, 
IDP’s, or diasporas (including ethnic communities spread 
throughout regional urban settings). The article proposes 
that the way forward relies on strategies which avoid the 
subalternization of local perspectives, local knowledge, and 
local practices.
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Introduction
The Afghanistan‑Pakistan border region now routinely commands the lime‑
light of international affairs and of Western policy debates, albeit with a highly 
specialized set of perceptions and issues at stake. Af‑Pak, as the region has become 
known, is characterized as a ‘borderland integrated into networks of global con‑
flict’ (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 2), inhabited by ‘resilient’, ‘war‑mongering’ and 
‘extremism‑inclined’ people. Perceived as a mono‑ethnic Pahstun hinterland, the 
region is seen by the international community as a crucial element in the current 
fight against terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking endangering the cosmo‑
politan heartlands of our world. Forgotten seem to be times of this border region 
not being remote, at the periphery or even at the end of the world, but at the centre 
of crossing civilizations, their trading routes and thus a hub linking various coun‑
tries or even this region being at the heart of a great game between colonial powers 
such as imperial Russia and Britain. 
For decades now, the bilateral relations of Afghanistan and Pakistan have been 
marred by the issue of the Durand Line, a colonial legacy of demarcated border 
lines and socio‑political interdependencies between both countries’ political re‑
gimes and their respective foreign policy interests. The ethnic community of Pa‑
shtuns straddles both sides of the border – they are thus split by the Durand Line 
despite their ethnic and familial connections and loyalties. Furthermore, recent 
decades have seen the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan as a transnation‑
al space for political interventions of different kinds. These have ranged from es‑
tablishing a safe haven, training ground and operation basis for Afghan mujahideen 
and their Pakistani and Arab allies against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, to 
turning the border into a hub for anti‑Taliban forces in the 1990s, to the present day 
efforts at combating those insurgents fighting the UN‑mandated and NATO‑led 
International Stabilization Forces (ISAF) as well as the US‑American‑led Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF). 
These interventions were accompanied by floods of refugees transgressing na‑
tional borders through rather informal pathways. In this fluid and highly penetra‑
ble border region context, the flows people and goods (as well as weapons) are 
seen as a particular challenge to stabilize both countries in their quest for demo‑
cratic state‑building and their fight against terrorism. Given the current military 
operations against insurgents and Islamist militants conducted in this highly in‑
terdependent and transnational space, a humanitarian emergency led to a wave 
of refugees entering Afghanistan for protection, or travelling further away from 
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the border region and into urban centers such as Peshawar in search of protection 
from the fighting, as civilians were caught up between both fronts. In other words, 
the international militaries as well as the international insurgents both mounted 
enormous pressure on the local civilian population. 
Having said that, it is ironic that much of the related academic literature on 
transnationalization focuses primarily on migration, economy and civil society 
activism (Harpviken, 2006), and yet so little policy‑relevant literature on the Af‑
Pak strategy has picked up on the insights of transnationalism research. Indeed, 
the border region between Kabul and Islamabad – with its diverse coalitions, net‑
works and movements and their local, regional and global dimensions – can serve 
as a prime example of transnational contentious politics and transnational mobili‑
zation of resources. This border region also challenges commonly used concepts of 
state and statehood, especially with regard to border regimes and their practices. 
Furthermore, policy reports, journalist and activist accounts as well as academic 
literature all too often generate a problematic account of the daily realities of the 
local people “in the field“. Such approaches all too often focus on the engagement 
of “expert outsiders” the encounters they experienced – while routinely ignoring 
the practices and voices of local civilians. As a result of this, the inhabitants of this 
border region are often depicted through (rather neocolonial) terms of the outside 
civilizer, as benevolent and considerate s/he might be. 
Take for example the following quotation of bestselling author and education 
activist Greg Mortenson (Three Cups of Tea: Stones into Schools) in a 2009 chapter 
entitled “The People at the End of the Road”: 
“The good people who inhabit the frontiers of civilization do not, as a rule, tend 
to be the world’s most sophisticated or cosmopolitan human beings. Often, they 
aren’t even especially well educated or refined, nor all that conversant with cut‑
ting‑edge trends in areas like, say, fashion and current events. Sometimes, they’re 
not even all that friendly. But the folks who live at the end of the road are among 
the most resilient and the most resourceful human beings you will ever meet. They 
possess a combination of courage, tenacity, hospitality, and grace that leaves me in 
awe.” (Mortenson 2009: 35‑36)
International media also employ similar portrayals of the border region. In a 
similar vein, Time magazine’s description of the area and its socio‑political make‑
up in a 2007 article on “The Truth about Talibanistan”1 treads a well‑worn, almost 
stereotypical path: 
Remote, tribal and deeply conservative, the border region is less a part of either 
country then a world unto itself, a lawless frontier so beyond the control of the 
1 Disponível em http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1601850,00.html 
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West and its allies that it has earned a name of its own: Talibanistan. In fact, the 
territory at the heart of Talibanistan – a heavily forested band of mountains that 
is officially called North and South Waziristan – has never fully submitted to the 
rule of any country. (…) Fueled by zealotry and hardened by war, young religious 
extremists have overrun scores of towns and villages in the border areas, with the 
intention of imposing their strict interpretation of Islam on a population unable to 
fight back.
In contrast, local experts – for instance, anthropologists like Magnus Marsden 
– strongly criticize such narratives, and instead attempt to draw a different picture 
of the border region and its inhabitants, their practices, agency, capacities and re‑
gimes (Marsden 2005, 2008). This chapter will thus engage in a critical dialogue 
with the existing mainstream accounts of the border region, and examine the dif‑
ferent social and political actors and (in)formal institutions operating in this highly 
transnational, diverse border region. We will analyze the different legacies and 
political struggles in recent decades with a special focus on the post‑9/11 develop‑
ments in the Afghanistan‑Pakistan border region2, and propose a broad post‑colo‑
nial, transnationalist approach to studying the area and its peoples, thus moving 
away from dominant narratives and the securitization/militarization they have 
engendered.
“Donkey vs. Durand”: The Fiction of a Border
“The borders that divide the region’s people open as they close”. 
Marsden (2008: 227).
A ‘border’ functions as a region, not as a dividing ‘line’; it is a transitory, hybrid 
area which is negotiated daily by diverse actors such as refugees, migrants, smug‑
glers, militants, traders, truckers as well as (inter‑)national security forces. The so‑
called ‘Durand Line’ – the actual frontier line, so to speak – is routinely overran 
by a daily movement of capital, trade, population, arms, ideologies and identities. 
One can say that it does not serve – for most part of the population and actors 
involved – as a “frontier of separation” (as envisioned by the imperial British) but 
rather as a “frontier of contact” (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 5). For centuries, if not 
2 This border region does not only include the much talked about Federal Administrated Tribal 
Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, bordering the insurgent‑prone southern and south‑eastern prov‑
inces of Afghanistan, but also the border provinces of Balochistan and North‑West Frontier 
Province (NWFP)
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millennia, it has been marked by socioeconomic porosity in terms of cross‑border 
movements control such as the more recent fencing initiative of former Pakistani 
President, General Pervaiz Musharraf, or different border closures under different 
political regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 1947.3 However, the penetra‑
bility of the border depends of the actor seeking access or crossing. While interna‑
tional forces, in particular US troops, are not allowed to cross over the border from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan and thus resort to high‑tech forms of border crossing and 
cross border fighting via military drone attacks, ordinary people apparently do not 
face such hurdles.
(…) Afghans say they can easily enter Pakistan by bribing guards on either side of 
the border with the equivalent of less than a dollar, or by paying taxi drivers a simi‑
lar token amount to drive them across. The guards do not ask those in the taxi for 
identification or search the trunk. The way the Taliban use Pakistan’s tribal areas to 
launch cross‑border attacks inside Afghanistan, is perhaps the most contentious is‑
sue between Pakistan and the United States. But the problem is hardly contained to 
Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas. Gaping holes in security checks along the border also 
remain at heavily trafficked crossings (…).  (Mekhennet and Oppel Jr., 2010).
As can be witnessed (especially by standing at any of a number of local border 
crossings), socioeconomic and political mobilization – indeed daily life patterns in 
general – have been and still are inherently ‘transnational’: they pre‑date the crea‑
tion of the modern states we call Afghanistan and Pakistan, and continue despite 
them, regardless of the quality of their statehood, along this ancient South and 
Central Asian trade, trafficking and smuggling route4. 
The current 2,400 km‑long frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Du‑
rand Line, remains a contested international border since 1893 – a colonial legacy 
3 The most recent call for a border fencing was uttered in July 2009 by the current Pakistani 
Prime Minister Gilani in order „to curb illegal crossings, especially militants’ inflitration into its 
territory“ as well as of drug traffickers (Pajwok Monitor, 04.07.2009, Pakistan renews calls for 
border fencing, www.pajhwok.com (as of 13.07.2009). Previously, both Afghan and Pakistani 
governments attempted to implement border closures, e.g in the late 1950s and in 1961, which 
were largely circumvented by people’s continued practices of crossborder socioeconomic ac‑
tivities (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 7; Modrzejewska‑Lesniewska, 2002: 75).
4 For accounts that emphasise the existence and importance of the border routes, and the flows 
of peoples, goods and ideas that criss‑crossed them, specifically before or during the state‑
formation periods of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. See for instance B. D. Hopkins’s history 
of modern‑day Afghanistan (Hopkins, 2008: 110‑162), or Sana Haroon’s examination of the 
religious‑familial character of networks that bound the polities of the border area with power 
centres beyond (Haroon, 2007).
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inherited by Pakistan upon its partition from British India in 1947 (Kakar, 2006: 
183‑189; Runion, 2007: 82‑83, 88‑89). The border has never fully been recognized 
by consecutive Afghan governments, which claimed a territorial stake in Baluch 
and Pashtun territories in Pakistan, and subsequently strained bilateral relations. 
(Rubin, Siddique, 2006: 1‑2, 6; Modrjejewska‑Lesnjewska, 2002). Attempts to de‑
marcate spheres of influence through a border and its regimes predate the current 
conflict between Kabul and Islamabad and take one back to the so called Great 
Game of Russian and British Empires in the 19th century (Rasanayagam, 2005: 
xviii, 7‑10). In more recent times, other geopolitical discourses and agendas are 
linked to the contested Durand Line. During the Cold War, Western and Arab 
governments used the borderland as a training ground and a safe haven for anti‑
Soviet mujahideen in the 1980s after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, kindly 
facilitated by various Pakistani military and civilian regimes and the Inter‑Services 
Intelligence Agency (ISI), Pakistan’s secret service agency, which controlled most 
of the dispersed funding, training and weapons proliferation (Crile, 2004).
Moreover, since the country’s foundation, the conflict with India is at the core 
of Pakistan’s foreign policy and military agenda‑setting. As a consequence, Paki‑
stan’s military employs the concept of ‘strategic depth’ vis‑a‑vis Afghanistan in 
case of conflict, for example over Kashmir or an imminent Indian attack (Rubin 
and Siddique, 2006: 6). In a rare public statement, Pakistan’s military top com‑
mander, General Ashfaq Kayani warned that „an environment hostile to Pakistan 
could strain its battle against militancy and extremism“ and further emphasized 
its focus on India in terms of foreign and defense policies:
Pakistan wants a ‘peaceful, friendly and stable’ Afghanistan; strategic depth 
isn’t about ‘controlling’ Afghanistan but about ensuring Pakistan doesn’t have a 
long‑term security problem on its western border; India’s role in Afghanistan is 
‘unhelpful’; and Pakistan wants Afghan state institutions, including the army and 
the police force, to be fashioned in a manner that they don’t pose a threat to our 
‘strategic interests’ (as paraphrased by Dawn, 2010; cf. Hussain, 2010).
Furthermore, the colonial frontier dividing the ethnic community of approxi‑
mately fourty million Pashtuns – and thus the ‘Pashtunistan Question’ with its 
options of secession, autonomy or integration – has been instrumentalised by both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Rasanayagam, 2007: 27‑37; Wirsing, 1991: 29‑30). Pash‑
tun nationalists regard the border demarcation as arbitrary, dividing the member 
of its community and their territory between two states. For secessionists, Pashtu‑
nistan would not only consist of parts of FATA or NWFP, but also of Balochistan 
– an unthinkable step for any Pakistani government after having suffered already 
the secession of Eastern Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and the continuous conflict 
with India over Kashmir. Pakistani officials fear that a strong Afghan state might 
support and reinforce the quest for an independent Pashtun state in the provinces 
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of NWFP and Balochistan. Furthermore, „[t]he Baluch also live on both sides of 
the Durand Line in the southwest border region, as well as in neighboring Iran“ 
and have mounted at least five insurgencies against the Pakistani state in the same 
border region (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 5, 7).
Currently, we find a Pashtun‑led government in Kabul under President Ha‑
mid Karzai, with Pashtuns being the largest ethnic community of the country (an 
estimated fourty percent of the population), and regionally as well as nationally 
successful Pashtun nationalist political parties in Pakistan, governing for instance 
in NWFP and serving as a coalition partner of the government of President Zard‑
ari and Prime Minister Gilani since 2008 (representing fifteen to twenty percent 
of the population). In fact, since the 1960s successive Pakistani governments have 
employed an Islamization agenda to counter Pashtun nationalism and its potential 
secessionist threat, attempting to override Pashtun identity with a predominantly 
religious‑oriented one. Furthermore, Islamist groups were encouraged to seek Af‑
ghan counterparts from the 1960s onwards. Pashtun‑dominated Islamist parties 
are understood to having supported the Hezb‑e‑Islami of notorious Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar or the Afghan Taliban, whose figureheads are sought to have their 
bases in cities such as Quetta or Peshawar (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 10). It took 
the events of 9/11 for the world to understand that the Pan‑Islamist strategy and 
the support of jihadism against Soviet occupation and Pashtun secessionism had 
backfired terribly.
They [the Taliban] showed to what extent the mass violence, migrations, and 
ideological mobilization of the past three decades had transformed the border re‑
gion. They are a phenomenon of the borderland, a joint Afghanistan‑Pakistan net‑
work and organization. Afghan refugees, their children, and their grandchildren 
have coped with and interpreted their experiences in the refugee camps, tribal 
territories, and urban slums of Pakistan through the lens of the Islamist education 
that Pakistan’s military regime and its Saudi and U.S. patrons offered them along‑
side their classmates from Pakistan, including FATA. Pashtuns are no more or less 
prone to extremism than members of any other ethnic group in the region, but 
intelligence agencies and radical movements have used their cross‑border ties and 
strategic location to spread extremism. (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 9‑10)
Having said that, it is important to remember that the Pashtun nationalist 
movement has had a Ghandian‑style predecessor: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and 
his civic movement, the Khudai Khidmatgar (‘Servants of God’). The so called 
“Frontier Gandhi” and his “Servants of God” emerged in the 1930s as a non‑vio‑
lent nationalist movement in the wake of the anti‑colonial struggle within British 
India, later Pakistan (Banerjee, 2000; Easwaran, 1999; Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 
6‑7). Its descendents are currently governing NWFP with the subsequently estab‑
lished secular Awami National Party (ANP) and which follow a pro‑peace deal 
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and developmental agenda when dealing with violent insurgencies in the region.
FATA thus serves – and has historically served – as a kind of a buffer zone, and 
both countries have offered sanctuary for the other’s opponents and their cross 
border insurgencies – be it the anti‑Soviet mujahideen, Pakistani or Afghan Taliban, 
Pashtun or Baloch nationalists or globally operating militants of Al Qaeda and 
its affiliates (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 3, 8). With the size of Luxemburg and an 
estimated population ranging from three and a half to seven million inhabitants, 
the region is marked by comparatively low socioeconomic development opportu‑
nities. Only seventeen percent of males (national average: forty percent) and three 
percent of females (national average: thirty‑two percent) are literate. The regional 
income is half of the national average (250 US‑Dollar compared to 500) and an 
estimated unemployment rate of sixty to eighty percent (Markey, 2008: 5‑7; Rubin 
and Siddique, 2006: 12ff):
The economic situation in the borderlands is equally dire. The wars in and over Af‑
ghanistan during the past three decades have transformed the economy of these trib‑
al territories from one based on subsistence agriculture and nomadic pastoralism to 
dependence on the unregulated, cross border trade of goods, including contraband 
such as drugs and arms. The area depends on smuggling routes that exploit the Af‑
ghani Transit Trade Agreement, under which goods may be imported duty‑free into 
Pakistan for reexport to Afghanistan; many are illegally re‑exported or simply sold 
in Pakistan (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 13).
In addition, FATA remains under a peculiar discriminatory political regime, 
which is currently under revision. It has been governed by a colonial and trib‑
al code of rules (Frontier Crimes Regulation) despite its semiautonomous status 
within the political system of Pakistan, due to which national legislation is not 
enforced in the region which is instead ruled by a succession of unchecked political 
agents, appointed tribal leaders and where political parties are barred from operat‑
ing (Markey 2008: 5‑7; Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 12ff).
And the ethnic and political complexity of the border does not stop here. As 
already mentioned, the border region does not only consist of FATA or the South‑
Eastern Afghan Pashtun‑belt, but also includes the Pakistani provinces of Balo‑
chistan and North‑Western Frontier Province with Baloch citizens (dispersed to 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and a nationalist movement and insurgencies of 
their own). The region further contains a strong Shia population in the NWFP 
agencies of Kurran or Chitral which served for instance as safe havens for perse‑
cuted Afghan Shia Hazaras or Tajiks. This border region is thus marked by a wide 
range of ethno linguistic communities with a high level of transregional mobility 
and hybrid identities (Marsden, 2008: 214, 223; Marsden 2005).
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The Current Securitization of the Border Area:  Shortcomings and Biases
To Western policy‑makers, as we have already suggested, the border region be‑
tween Pakistan and Afghanistan is seen mostly through the lens of security – a fact 
which can easily be gleaned from the many policy reports emanating from Western 
governments on the Af‑Pak issue.
Among the security threats flagged by such literature, Islamist militancy in the 
Af‑Pak border area is by far the most cited (Acharya, Bukhari and Sulaiman, 2009; 
Bajoria, 2009; Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro, 2009; Gunaratna and Nielsen, 2008; Za‑
hab and Roy, 2004). As one U.S. government report succinctly puts it, from the 
American point of view the increase of militancy in the border areas “poses three 
key national security threats: an increased potential for major attacks against the 
United States itself; a growing threat to Pakistani stability; and a hindrance of U.S. 
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan” (Kronstadt and Katzman, 2008). The nightmare 
scenario, in the minds of several analysts and prominent politicians, is that this 
process of Talibanization of the border areas would spill‑over to engulf the whole 
of Pakistan, potentially leaving the country’s government and its nuclear arsenal 
in the hands of Islamist militants (Arnoldy, 2009; Hersh, 2009; Kerr and Nikitin, 
2010: 10‑14)5.
As we can see, the securitization6 of the border region is achieved by employing 
a discourse that indelibly links that geographic area to violent Islamist militancy, 
and in turn sets the two against the key goals of contemporary American foreign 
policy in the region – the war on terror, democracy promotion, nuclear non‑prolif‑
eration and post‑conflict state‑building. This, in turn, has resulted in a host of calls 
for “securing Pakistan’s tribal belt” (Markey, 2008), including extending counterin‑
5 Assuming, that is, that a set of relatively small local movements, hailing from essentially rural 
areas and driven by a multi‑issue agenda could somehow mobilise enough resources to project 
its power over hundreds of thousands of  square kilometres, defeat the world’s sixth largest 
armed forces, take over two mega‑cities and one of the most secure capitals in Asia, and con‑
vince Pakistan’s military to hand over the nuclear codes – and then legitimise itself successfully 
before a population of 170 million and a growing middle‑class (Ahmed, 2009)
6 For the purposes of this chapter, securitization – a term coined by the Copehangen school 
of critical security studies ‑refers to the process whereby a socio‑political actor discursively 
defines a particular issue as a security issue, implying that this issue poses a grave, existential 
threat to any given referent (in the present case, the stability of the region, the governments of 
Afghanistan or Pakistan, etc.). Securitization processes work by moving an issue away from 
the realm of open, inclusive, deliberative politics, and by investing security issues with a de‑
gree of urgency, exceptionalism, violence, thereby making them the realm of executive power. 
For an overview of the securitization concept and associated scholarship (Buzan, Waever and 
de Wilde, 1998: 23‑26; Emmers, 2007; Taureck, 2006)
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surgency principles (already being applied in the Afghan theater of operations) to 
the border area (White, 2009), tempered by a dose of (state‑initiated) development 
aid for those populations deemed most at risk, or most essential to the success of 
the counterinsurgency campaign.
While research on the securitization of the Af‑Pak border area may take us into 
several directions, we are especially interested here in examining the discursive con‑
struction of the region as a danger to international security, thereby opening it up to 
a series of (heavily militarized) interventions. The focus of this section is therefore 
on the descriptions of the region employed by academics, policy‑makers, journal‑
ists and politicians to literally conjure something called “Af‑Pak” into existence, 
to endow that area (and its population) with a series of dangerous or threatening 
characteristics, and to thus justify a new regional strategy on the part of Western 
governments, especially the U.S.. In other words, what elements are emphasized in 
the description of the border region in order to effectively convince audiences that it 
represents an existential threat that must be dealt with via security policy? Below we 
examine the key discursive clusters that are regularly employed and emphasized in 
(mis)representing the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Tribe and Prejudice7
The first discursive cluster we examine here as part and parcel of the securi‑
tizing narrative surrounding the border area could be provisionally termed the 
“tribalization” of the border region. By “tribalization” we mean the narrowing of 
prevalent accounts concerning the social, political, economic and cultural make‑
up of the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan, so as to focus almost 
exclusively on the (supposed) tribal organization of life, and even then focusing 
almost always on Pashtun tribal elements. And there is no shortage of proponents 
of some variation of “the key to victory in this area of the world is understanding 
(and successfully instrumentalizing) it’s essentially tribal nature‑discourse” (Blatt 
et al., 2009; Gant, 2009; Johnson and Mason, 2007). 
In many ways, this discursive move follows the general blueprint already cri‑
tiqued by Edward Said in his Orientalism thesis (Said, 1978). In this particular case, 
such accounts are problematic in at least three ways. 
The first of these is that such accounts often ignore the heavy imprint of (Brit‑
ish) colonialism in our conceptualization of tribal arrangements in the border area. 
7 The wonderfully apt phrase has been coined by Joshua Foust (2010), himself  a critical voice 
when it comes to the “tribalization” of security policy in the Af‑Pak context, especially in the 
excellent Registan blog (www.registan.net) 
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Rather than simply having “encountered” tribal structures already in place, the 
zeal of British colonial administrators to subdue the local populations under the 
rule of the Raj lead them to actually reify local structures of power, often tweaking 
them to fit colonial objectives. This translated into the elaboration of tribal tables, 
aided by colonial ethnographers‑cum‑administrators (Haroon, 2007: 8‑11, 25‑30), 
and the very creation of a geographic entity called the “Tribal Areas”. In other 
words, the architecture of local power in the tribal areas, and sometimes the very 
notion of a tribal identity, had to be (re)created by the British so that it could be 
co‑opted in the service of delivering alien modes of governance to a difficult and 
fiercely independent area (Beattie, 2002, Haroon, 2007: 5‑31; Lindholm, 2009)8. The 
repercussions of these schemes of imperial rule are still being felt to this day – one 
of the most important being the blinding shift from a transnational perspective of 
the frontier region, its populations and their cross‑border flows, to one directly in 
the service of modern states with ideally static borders, centralized authority, the 
ability to extract revenue and centralize taxation, and a desired monopoly over the 
legitimate means of coercion.
Secondly, the narrative of tribalization simultaneously de‑legitimates older, 
non or trans‑state modalities of local governance, and injects the state (Afghan, 
Pakistani, Western) – as paragon of modernity, guarantor of justice, provider of se‑
curity and development – as the single referent for Af‑Pak policy. In so doing, such 
a narrative ignores not only decades of research on state‑tribe relations in all their 
complexity (Christensen, 1986; Gross, 1998; Khoury and Kostiner, 1990; Noelle, 
1997; Shahrani, 2002; Tapper, 1983), but also realities on the ground and the daily 
practices and wishes of hundreds of thousands.
More importantly for the purposes of the present critique, perhaps, is the way 
in which the “tribal” narrative ignores and/or obscures alternative forms of politi‑
cal identity and activism in the border areas (a point we elaborate upon below). 
Lost in these mainstream narratives, then, is the richness of the frontier and its 
daily life, the nuance and diversity of its cultures. What of other communities that 
inhabit the frontier – like the Kohistanis (Knudsen, 2009), the Kalasha, the Pashai, 
the Nuristani or the Kirghiz of the Wakhan? What of the tens of thousands of in‑
8 Yet, despite protestations against the charge of neo‑colonialism or neo‑imperialism, American 
policy makers – especially those hailing form defense circles – have (re)discovered tribal en‑
gagement as a strategy for the Af‑Pak region. This unfortunate trend has many contemporary 
manifestations under the evolving Af‑Pak strategy endoresed by the Obama administration 
– from calls to “winning the war, one tribe at the time” (Gant, 2009), to the deployment of “hu‑
man terrain teams” of social scientists embedded in military teams to study the local tribes, to 
the (re)activation and use of tribal militias in the fight against the Taliban (a strategy employed 
by both the US and Pakistan).
Nação e Defesa 214
Daniel Pinéu e Andrea Fleschenberg
dividuals, from pasthun and other ethnic backgrounds, that have migrated to the 
lowlands and cities on both sides of the border in search for work, an education 
for themselves or their children, a better life – to what extent does the mainstream 
tribal narrative apply to them? What of class, gender, status, how do they inter‑
sect with the tribal narrative to give us a better purchase on the (in)securities en‑
gendered in the region? The tribal narrative, then – as employed en passant by 
politicians, time‑pressured analysts, or uninformed journalists looking for rousing 
metaphors – is often (blissfully?) unaware of the wealth of historical and/or ethno‑
graphic material that has been compiled about the area and its peoples. 
As a result, “tribal” as a concept is further reduced, taken to mean a kind of 
stereotypical Pashtun: rural, male, mysoginist, religiously conservative in the 
Sunni tradition, hopelessly shackled to traditional modes of behavior such as the 
Pashtunwali, rebellious and prone to violence. But how well does this view fit with 
the daily realities of local traders that buy goods across the Persian Gulf and sell 
them throughout the Af‑Pak border region? Or the local smugglers, plowing the 
thousands of difficult kilometers between the Central Asian Republics and the Af‑
Pak border passes? Or the Afghan refugees that have made a place for themselves 
in Peshawar, mastering four or five local languages, running a successful business, 
and trying to learn computer skills in community centers to improve their busi‑
ness? Or the local woman turned activist that has completed her medical degree 
and braves the rugged terrain and the threats of islamists in order to set up a trans‑
border medical service for widows and children?
Mullahs and Militants
Another key discursive cluster that often makes its way into securitizing ac‑
counts of the Af‑Pak border addresses the issue of violent Islamist militancy, or 
radical Islam more generally. As already mentioned at the outset of this section, 
policy‑makers – as well as academics and journalists – often justify more or less 
militarized interventions into the border area by invoking the threat posed by the 
(potentially violent) political mobilization of Islamic militants. In such accounts, 
the mixture of religion and politics in the area, coupled with the “tribal”, “ungov‑
ernable” and “warlike” character of the local populations mentioned above, make 
the region an explosive one. As a result, phenomena as diverse – and as different in 
its causes, modus operandi and potential consequences – as the Pakistani Taliban, 
the Afghani Taliban, several islamist organizations, tribal militias, radical clerics 
and their ideological followers and conservative Pashtuns are often conflated in a 
misleading amalgamation (Markey, 2008: 16‑18).
It is, of course, indisputable that Islamist militants have engaged in violent 
campaigns in the region – targeting not only security forces (Western, Pakistani 
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and Afghan) but also local power brokers and the general population as well, often 
as reprisal for their resistance, assertion of autonomy, or behavior deemed immor‑
al and unacceptable. As such, those violent actors have also contributed through 
both discourse and (murderous) practice to the streamlined narrative of the border 
as a security threat that states must deal with through the use of force. While the 
mainstream discourse on the border could in fact benefit from a much more ac‑
curate depiction of the contours of violent Islamic militancy in the area, as well as 
a better distinction between historically situated local resistance against perceived 
encroachment by the central state versus transnational jihadism, the limited scope 
of this chapter precludes us from entering that line of inquiry. Instead, this section 
focuses essentially on a series of mischaracterizations of “lived Islam” in the region 
that contribute to the securitization of Islamic activism even when it is not violent.
One of the most obvious ways in which this appears in accounts of the Af‑Pak 
area is the constant emphasis on the violent character of political Islam. If most of 
the violence and insecurity in the region is attributable to Islamist militants and 
the governmental reactions they spark, it is understandable that policy‑makers 
would vocally worry about the marrying of Islam and political mobilization, or to 
put it in other words, the joining of (transnational) social movements and mobiliz‑
ing for contentious politics (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007). But this must be countered 
by two other ideas: the first is that the vast majority of Islamist contentious politi‑
cal mobilization and activism is non‑violent (including in the region), the second 
that political Islam can be – and indeed historically has been – a force for peaceful 
settlement of disputes, modernization, and an avenue to protest/dissent against 
state‑policy (Esposito and Burgat, 2003; Chernov‑Hwang, 2009).
Both ideas find expression historically in the Af‑Pak border (Haroon, 2007). 
Firstly, as we have already mentioned, there is the legacy of Badshah Khan and his 
Servants of God movement. As the name readily indicates, this was a religiously 
inspired movement aimed at the political mobilization of Pasthuns to resist Brit‑
ish colonialism (Banerjee, 2000; Johansen, 1997). However, rather than deploying 
a repertoire of violent actions – and contrary to stereotypical notions of Pasthun 
religious fanaticism and commitment to violence so prevalent in British Victorian 
accounts, – the case of Badsha Khan shows that “religion may motivate people for 
action against political repression while confining them to nonviolent means in 
pursuit of humanitarian ends” (Johansen, 1997: 53). Moreover, Robert Johansen’s 
study of religious empowerment and constraints on use of violence among Past‑
huns wisely alerts us that “a preoccupation with the violent elements of these [re‑
ligious and tribal/nationalist] traditions may impede the expression of their less 
violent themes” (ibid.). 
The same could be said with regard to the sensitive issue of Islamic education 
in a madrasah setting and the often touted links to violent extremist activity. In 
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peripheral regions afflicted by a dearth of development schemes, welfare and free, 
reliable, state‑run education facilities such as the NWFP, FATA, Balochistan or their 
neighbouring southern Afghan provinces, attending a madrasah is often the only 
way for entire generations of children to have any education at all ‑ especially since 
almost all are free of cost, and many include boarding. However, the last decade 
has seen the rise of an important anti‑madari sentiment among Western policy‑
makers and academics. 
In such accounts, madaris are denounced as “terrorist factories” – or, in the 
best case, highly problematic institutions bent on ideological indoctrination of 
children, and as such in need of urgent substitution by state‑run schools (Fair, 
2008; Stern, 2000; Singer, 2001). While such characterizations may resonate with 
our (scant) knowledge of the madrasah‑educated youth that filled the ranks of 
the Taliban in the 1990’s, it does not stand up to what we know today about 
madaris. In fact, several authors have presented a much more balanced, histori‑
cally informed and accurate picture of the nature and role of madrasah educa‑
tion, which could profitably be used to guide Western policy towards the Af‑Pak 
border (and South Asia in general) (Zaman, 2002: 74‑78; Riaz, 2008; Hefner and 
Zaman, 2007; Malik, 2007; Noor, Sikand and Bruinesen, 2009). Among these al‑
ternative accounts, one must in particular pay attention to studies that carefully 
de‑construct the reasons for over‑focusing on madrasah education in general as 
a (security) threat (Bano, 2007; Bergen and Pandey, 2006). In a region as complex 
and as ignored by state welfare schemes as the Af‑Pak border – and even despite 
the efforts of Greg Mortensen and his Central Asian Institute to extend commu‑
nity schooling dramatically ‑ madrasah education may be the best change that 
hundreds of thousands of children have to gain access to education and personal 
advancement. Rather than securitizing madaris in general because of the links 
between a small share of them and violent islamist militants, we should realize 
that they can turn out profoundly religious, conservative, politically active, tran‑
snationally mobile individuals who are also community leaders, strong moral 
examples, and non‑violent activists against a host of perceived social, political 
and economic injustices in the region.
This brings us to one last issue regarding the securitization of the border area 
through discourses about the danger of religious political mobilization and  “Tali‑
banization” – the purported lack of agency of local population vis‑à‑vis radical 
islamists. As Magnus Marsden insightfully observes:
Indeed, the predominantly rural societies in which much of South Asia’s and 
other Muslim populations live continue to be stereotyped as intellectually barren, 
rendering Muslim villages as places of non‑thought. 
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(…) More specifically, they also reveal the widely held assumption that villagers are 
deficient intellectually, and, once educated, will inevitably ‘Islamise’ because Islam 
is a faith of codes, rules and book standards, (…). Nowhere has this been more ap‑
parent than in both popular and academic accounts of Pakistan’s Frontier province, 
where the use of the term ‘Talibanisation’ has conveyed a view that Muslims in the 
region do not think but, instead, just somehow become ‘fundamentalist’ and Taliban‑
like (…). (Marsden 2005: 10).
Instead of partaking in such a blatantly racist view of the populations that in‑
habit the Af‑Pak area, we should pay attention to the various ways in which they 
actively negotiate – rather than simply passively receiving – the issue of religious 
orthodoxy in their everyday lives. The people living in this area have survived 
countless military actions, state and militant repression in their daily lives, poverty 
and low agricultural yields, natural catastrophes and much more. They have man‑
aged to thrive under conditions that would appeal most Western policy‑makers, 
provide for themselves and their extended families, gain a measure of education, 
and negotiate the enormous challenges of globalization and modernization. They 
have evolved a sophisticated culture that prizes moral rectitude, individual iden‑
tity, courtesy and hospitality and the ability to articulate ideas and take pleasure 
in discussing complex issues. We should therefore afford them more than simply 
being the passive, voiceless recipients of an Af‑Pak strategy of military interven‑
tion tempered by problematic development schemes. We should listen, and learn, 
and actively ensure that the people of the area determine their welfare and their 
future on their own terms.
Politics of Transnationality
While the tendency remains to focus and listen to those wielding guns, the di‑
verse humanitarian emergencies for borderland citizens have not caused much of 
a public stir in the last decades and years – it’s not Bali or Haiti after all, but most 
likely the wrong people on the run. The transborder and transnational space under 
review is one of hybrid identities precisely due to countless refugees caused by 
subsequent local, regional and global political conflicts, not only by cross national 
trading and militant mobilization. Thus refugees, their strategies and agency in‑
cluded, are another category that should inform on and contribute to our depic‑
tions, perceptions and understandings of the border region. 
There is no shortage of examples of the role of refugees in the transnational 
politics of the border area. In the 1970s, for instance, one of the Balochistan insur‑
gencies resulted in a wave of thirty thousand refugees to Afghanistan while as a 
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consequence of the fighting in Soviet occupied Afghanistan, more than five mil‑
lion Afghans fled across the border into Pakistan where most remained in FATA, 
NWFP, Balochistan alongside other destinations in Pakistan (Rubin and Siddique, 
2006: 4). Since 2002, over three million of them have returned to Afghanistan, but 
around two million remain and are not very likely to return after becoming part 
of Pakistani society as „semi‑permanent refugees“ (Marsden, 2008: 213). By now, 
an estimated fifty percent of Afghans have either lived or visited Pakistan while 
around sixty thousand Pakistanis work in Afghanistan, ten thousands crossing the 
border daily. (Rubin and Siddique, 2006: 19)
Since 2008, the current operations of the Pakistani military in its fight against 
jihadists and local insurgents have caused several waves of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) within Pakistan, alongside the IDPs generated in large numbers 
in the Southern Afghan provinces due to fighting between insurgents and (inter‑)
national forces. Despite differing numbers, it is estimated that more than three 
million Pakistani IDPs moved in the years 2008‑2010, most og which to or within 
NWFP, and that some 20.000 others have fled to Afghanistan (assisted by the UN 
and NATO) – “the worst refugee crisis since partition from India in 1947” (Tavern‑
ise, 2009; Aljazeera, 2009; BBC News, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2009a; Irin 
News, 2009; Platt, 2009; Perlez and Zubair Shah, 2008). The International Crisis 
Group denounced this sad state of affairs in its 2009 report “Pakistan’s IDP Crisis”, 
intimating that the Pakistani civilian government, as well its military forces, were 
responsible for the waves of refugees, and that they largely failed to support IDPs 
in their most basic needs for shelter, health care, education and income substi‑
tution. An exception might become the redirected federal government’s Benazir 
Bhutto Income Support Program (BISP), under which socioeconomically vulner‑
able receive direct payments, in addition to free access to health care, life insurance 
and vocational training and which will pledges to support 45.00 IDP families of the 
total of 250.000 families (International Crisis Group, 2009a: 10). 
Since most of the refugees remain with extended family or in private homes, 
only a small portion was registered in camps and thus entitled and able to receive 
direct support. At the same time, Islamist welfare organizations and welfare activi‑
ties of militant organizations provide support for IDPs on their own terms and in 
their own camps, thus repeating the pattern manifest in the wake of the 2005 earth‑
quake relief effort in and close to Kashmir, sparking reports that “jihadi indoctri‑
nation in Al‑Khidmat and FIF camps and schools are widespread” (International 
Crisis Group, 2009a: 8). 
These strategies continue to impact in particular on women IDPs. According 
to Farzana Bari, head of the Qaid‑e‑Azam University Excellence Center for Gen‑
der Studies in Islamabad, women were and are central to the Taliban version of Is‑
lam which focuses on women’s dependency from males as well as on the control 
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of women’s mobility and sexuality. At the same time, she stresses that the gender 
discourse is used by both sides, the Taliban as well as the government, for their own 
cause. Research conducted in 2009 with IDPs, indicates that the fighting between 
both sides led to a destruction of traditional spaces for women’s interactions and the 
merging of public / collective and private patriarchies. As IDPs, women are particu‑
larly vulnerable in terms of protection, compensation or access to relief packages. 
At the same time, women local councilors or women peace activists have neither 
been included in peace negotiation processes, as obligatory for signature states of the 
Resolution 1325 (2000), nor invited into reconstruction and relief efforts.9 
The number of IDPs from the Pakistani side of the border region is expected 
to increase further in 2010, as UN and other aid agencies prepare for an influx of a 
further 150.000 IDPs from FATA’s tribal areas and the much fought over Malakand 
division of NWFP. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitar‑
ian Affairs (OCHA), out of the 2.3 million IDPs in 2009, over a million remain dis‑
placed at the time of the writing in early 2010 – 113.500 in camps and the remaining 
with host families or relatives, mostly in NWFP (Irin News, 2010a). Many expect 
their displacement to be mid‑ to long‑term given the ongoing military operations 
and criticize the paucity of educational facilities for children as well as being “often 
denied jobs on suspicion of being militants” (Irin News, 2010b).
But the politics of transnational resource mobilization and political activism are 
not exhausted by looking at displaced populations and their plight. An additional 
good example to illustrate the complexity of the local context, as well as the way in 
way transnational/trans‑border mobilization occurs, according to Marsden (2008: 
227‑228) is the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), a private, international 
and non‑denominational development organization with various agencies and op‑
erating for instance in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Its activities focus on 
health, education, culture, rural and economic development as well as institution‑
building, predominantly in Africa and Asia. With sixty thousand employees in 
twenty‑five countries its annual budget for non‑profit development amounts to 450 
million US‑Dollar, funded by the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the Shia Ismaeli 
community whose followers primarily reside in South and Central Asia. The AKDN 
has various projects in the areas of health, education and welfare services as well as 
participatory rural development in Afghanistan and Pakistan with employees from 
Chitral for example working in Afghanistan. The Aga Khan is merely one player in a 
large constellation of NGO’s and other civil society initiatives that must be taken into 
9 Personal notes from presentation of Dr. Farzana Bari at the international conference on „Con‑
flict Management in the AfPak Region“, held in Berlin on 03.12.2009. Dr. Bari shared still un‑
published research and primary findings, part of an ongoing study.
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consideration when studying the border region10. In paying attention to their work‑
ings – something the mainstream accounts of region seldom do – one finds tools to 
support the transnational reading of politics advocated here, as well as combating 
the orientalist securitization of the Af‑Pak border and its peoples.
Studying Transnational Political and Social Mobilisation in the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Border – Suggestions Rather than Conclusions
This globalized borderland has transnationality at the centre of its daily realities. 
Therefore, opting for a transnational lens when examining the patterns of political 
mobilization of the local population is not only trendy scholarship – it is inherently 
in tune with the historical context and the contemporary realities of life “across the 
border”. This crucial aspect needs to be included in the agenda‑setting and mech‑
anisms of conflict‑resolution, which would allow for a much more nuanced, fine‑
grain picture of social and political mobilization in the Afghanistan‑Pakistan border 
region, thereby going beyond the currently domineering securitizing discourse. 
Therefore, we contend that any useful study of or policy for the border region 
should focus on the strategies and repertories (i.e. practices) of actors, as examples 
of transnational (and specifically transborder) mobilization that transcends both 
formal state institutions, and the legal strictures of the Durand Line. Moreover, 
the list of actors to study – especially for those trying to develop policy‑relevant 
recommendations – should go beyond the stereotypes commonly found. Instead, 
such a list should include diverse social and political movements and networks 
and examine their relationship to one another, often building coalitions, or at least 
interacting in looser transnational coalitions (e.g. transnational economic entre‑
preneurs such as smugglers or narco‑traffickers with militants). In addition to a 
study of the complex patterns of interaction between actors, the competent study 
of the border region must also pay attention to the strategies of actors in relation to 
the transborder, transnational space they inhabit (social as well as geographic) in 
which mobilization and practices occur, as in the case of refugees, IDP’s, or diaspo‑
ras (including ethnic communities spread throughout regional urban settings).
As we hope to have demonstrated, the border areas between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan are a complex setting that defies static, and statist generalizations – gen‑
10  Significantly, these NGO’s include a host of local organisations, thus underscoring the need 
to include local agency while studying the politics of transnational activism in the complex 
border area. These local NGO’s include the All Pakistan Women’s Association (http://www.
apwapakistan.com/), and the Aurat Foundation (http://af.org.pk/mainpage.htm), among 
others.
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eralizations that often betray the prejudices left behind as traces of a bygone colo‑
nial era, or the ongoing power of Orientalist discourse. If the essentialist models 
of Pasthun tribalism and Islamic radicalization are flawed, in what ways do lo‑
cal actors negotiate their identity, their political loyalties? In the distorted mirror 
of essentialist generalizations – the “essentially tribal nature of the region”, the 
“fundamentally conservative nature of Pasthuns”, the “inevitable radicalization of 
madrassah students”, – very little can be discerned which is of use to either better 
understand or improve the conditions of life in the border. 
As we tried to convincingly argue, the way around this relies on strategies of 
avoiding the subalternization of local perspectives, local knowledge, and local 
practices. What are the people that inhabit this complex social space saying about 
themselves and the events unfolding in the region – what is being told and dis‑
cussed in tea‑houses, schools, waiting rooms, bustling bazaars, in newspapers and 
over the airwaves?11 Where can we discern the webs of civil society – the myriads 
of local organizations? On must pay attention to the strategies for asserting agency 
of local, “tribal“ populations, i.e. framing, mobilization and repertoires, thus mov‑
ing beyond the pro‑extremism bias we assume for them. As a case in point, in the 
February 2008 parliamentary elections, the electorate of FATA voted in its majority 
for secular nationalist parties and not Islamist parties in their call for socioeconom‑
ic and political mainstreaming (or even mere inclusion) in order to move beyond 
the colonial status of the Frontier Crimes Regulation or the ban of civil society 
organizations and aid agencies. As a result, the Awami National Party – the direct 
heirs of Abdul Ghaffar Kahn and his social movement – entered local government, 
having also won seats in Balochistan and Sindh.
The bulk of mainstream reports, studies and policy briefings about the Af‑Pak 
border area have been majoritarily concerned with what the national policies of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan should be like towards the region and its population. 
Or, they have overwhelmingly focused on what strategy Western governments – 
most prominently the U.S. – should adopt towards achieving our goals in the area, 
goals that start from the state‑centric assumption of a coherent set of national poli‑
cies that neatly encompass the messy social reality of a transnational space. What 
would our engagement look like if it started from the inherently transborder prac‑
tices of the local populations? What would an “Af‑Pak strategy” look like from the 
point of view of the Awami National party and its voters, for instance? What can 
we learn from them? Probably, that we need to start crossing borders – physical 
and metaphorical – more often, and better.
11  We thank Manan Ahmed for his helpful and insightful comments on the matter.
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